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Weak Power, Great Influence: Small States in EU Foreign Policy. The Case of Belgium and 
Greece. 
I Introduction 
While the study of small states1 has passed its climax in International Relations (IR), the 
progressive development of the European Union (EU) over the past few decades has given rise to 
a proliferation of studies on the subject of small states in Europe. The questions scholars aim at 
answering relate to the difficulties in defining small states, their behavior and their opportunities 
for influence (Goetschel 1998, Archer and Nugent 2002, Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006, Steinmetz 
and Wivel 2010). Even though several studies have addressed the role of small states in the EU’s 
rapidly expanding international activities, most authors continue to disregard their role. The 
prevailing Realist reading of EU foreign policy2 (Hoffmann 2000, Gégout 2002, Hill 2004) states 
that it is dominated by the large member states, i.e. France, Germany and the United Kingdom, 
with success foremost dependent on the extent to which they have common interests. The ‘big 
three’ are considered to be a leadership group, precooking decisions which are then formally 
adopted by all member states. For small states there is not much choice other than to accept the 
authority of large member states. 
Recent advances point out, however, that under specific conditions small states may yield 
substantial influence in EU foreign policy (Arter 2000, Ojanen 2000, Kronsell 2002, Romsloe 
2004, Björkdahl 2008, Bunse 2009, Jakobsen 2009). Based on a literature review, Jakobsen (2009: 
86-88) has given an encompassing overview of factors explaining small states’ possibilities to 
influence EU foreign policy. He suggests that small states need to have a forerunner reputation, 
provide convincing arguments, excel in building coalitions and commit sufficient capabilities to 
support EU initiatives. Individual scholars place a different emphasis on the importance of all or a 
number of these factors.  
Whereas these studies have expanded our understanding of the role of small states in EU 
foreign policy, they suffer from two shortcomings. First, they tend to cover separate policy areas 
of EU foreign policy (Finland and the EU’s Northern Dimension Initiative (Arter 2000, Bunse 
2009), Sweden and the EU’s international environmental policies (Kronsell 2002) and EU conflict 
prevention (Björkdahl 2008), and the three Scandinavian countries in the development of 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (Ojanen 2000, Romsloe 2004, Jakobsen 2009). It 
can, nonetheless, not a priori be assumed that a given small state may be able to play an influential 
role in all areas of EU foreign policy. Studies demonstrate that there is neither a single group of 
actors nor a single resource of power that is strong enough to dominate the policy process across 
all policy areas (Willetts 1990; Hofmann and Türk 2006: 575). Whether and how small states’ 
possibilities for influence vary across policy areas is thus an empirical question. Second, studies of 
small states in IR remain largely cut off from studies conducted in the field of EU integration. This 
is remarkable given that the study of small states in IR has received significant scholarly attention 
over the past fifty years (for an overview, see Ingebritsen et.al. 2006). Linking the findings from 
studies of small states in Europe to the substantial body of scientific findings in IR might for that 
reason offer additional insights in the role of small states in EU foreign policy. 
This paper therefore wishes to examine if, to what extent and in what manner small states may 
influence EU foreign policy. Without discounting the role of large member states, it is argued that, 
contrary to Realist thinking, small states are able to play an influential role in EU foreign policy. 
The paper proposes a framework for analysis that is based on a review of the small states literature 
in IR as well as EU studies. It is argued that this may not only add to our understanding of the role 
of small states in EU foreign policy but also lead to a better understanding of the EU’s foreign 
policy-making system as a whole. The framework is applied on a comparative study of two small 
states regarding two foreign policy dossiers which are of particular interest to them: the role of 
Belgium in EU foreign policy towards the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the role 
of Greece in EU foreign policy towards Turkey.3 
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The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. A first part reviews the small states literature 
in IR and EU studies and proposes a framework for analyzing small states in EU foreign policy. 
The two subsequent parts examine the role of Belgium and Greece in EU foreign policy towards 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Turkey respectively. The conclusion rounds up the 
main findings and indicates areas for further research. 
 
II A Framework for Studying Small States in EU Foreign Policy 
 
The beginning of a ‘genuine school of small state studies’ can be situated in the late 1950s and the 
early 1960s. Early work was foremost preoccupied by the question of the survival of small states 
among the big powers. Besides the definitional issues related to the concept of ‘small states’, the 
bulk of research focused on what has become conventional wisdom to explain small state 
behavior, namely the system level of analysis. A consensus emerged that, in contrast to big states, 
small states try to maximize joint actions by targeting regional and international institutions 
(Rothstein 1968, Keohane 1969, Vital 1971, East 1973, Hey 2003). Subsequent scholars moved 
their attention to ‘the possible strategies small states might utilize to mitigate the effects of 
structural constraints’ (Ingebritsen et.al. 2006: 10). Authors like Vogel (1983) and Lindell and 
Persson (1986) proposed analytical frameworks that differentiate between ‘structurally determined 
behavior’ and ‘voluntary behavior’ of small states (Neumann and Gstöhl 2004: 7-10). This 
differentiation reflects two distinct levels of analysis, namely the systemic and state level 
respectively. Whereas the former can be referred to as the general environment which is 
impossible or very difficult for a small state to change, the latter relate to more direct causes of 
small state behavior (Lindell and Persson 1986: 80). 
With the progressive development of the EU, several scholars turned their attention to the 
position of small states in Europe. In contrast to IR literature, this has resulted in a proliferation of 
studies which have almost exclusively focused on the strategies of small states. Regarding the 
systemic level, EU studies do not go beyond the prevailing consensus which sees the EU as a 
favorable policy context for small states to pursue their interests and to fend off raw power politics 
(Grieco 1998, Joenniemi 1998). Baillie (1998: 195) and Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006: 658) are 
one of the few authors that link structural factors to state strategies in the context of the EU. They 
emphasize the importance to take the institutional set-up into account within a given policy area 
when studying the role of small states. Consequently, this paper argues that additional insights 
might be offered when those systemic factors identified in IR are linked to small states’ strategies 
identified in EU studies. Figure 1 summarizes the factors identified in IR and EU studies, 
integrating both the systemic and the state level of analysis. 
 
Systemic Level of Analysis 
 
As Vogel (1983) does, Lindell and Persson (1986) propose an integrated analytical framework that 
embraces both systemic and state factors. Especially Lindell and Persson (1986: 80-85) have 
indentified three systemic factors which are particularly relevant for the study of small states in 
EU foreign policy: the structure of the system, the state of the system and the prevailing norms 
within a given system. 
The structure of the system is defined as the extent to which a system is hegemonic or 
hierarchical, or whether it is characterized by a balance of power or not. In the context of the EU, 
this differentiation could be seen in terms of institutionalization: whether the policy area under 
investigation is densely institutionalized or whether it remains highly hierarchical. The varying 
extent of institutionalization is defined as a continuum designating the locus of decision-making, 
with at the one end a situation in which no or few EU-level decision authority has appeared 
(hierarchy) and at the other end a situation where policy decisions are governed by Community 
processes (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, Risse-Kappen 1996, Jachtenfuchs 2001). As 
extensively discussed in the small states literature, the degree of institutionalization is positively 
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correlated with possibilities for small state influence. Conversely, when EU institutions play 
hardly any role in the policy process, it will be harder for small states to exert influence and they 
may find themselves within the ‘sphere of influence’ of one of the large member states. 
A second systemic factor is the state of the system. This refers to the degree of tension and 
conflict between the dominating actors. It is generally assumed in IR that increased tension 
between the dominating actors leads to more possibilities for small states to exert influence. Lower 
tension or close cooperation between the dominating actors makes it much harder for small states 
to exert influence. This does, however, not imply that the relation between conflict among 
dominant actors and possibilities for small state influence is linear. It has been argued that there is 
an ‘optimal intensity of conflict or tension’. Up to this point, every increase in tension seems to be 
favorable to small states while when the degree of tension rises above this point, the possibilities 
for small state influence deteriorates (Frei 1969, Lindell and Persson 1986: 81-83). 
Prevailing norms are a last systemic factor, especially those norms that restrict the right to use 
certain (material) resources. Norms are generally associated with a constructivist reading, stressing 
the importance of informal rules, roles and identities. Especially in a context of dense 
institutionalization such as the EU, the importance of socialization processes is underlined. Rather 
than calculating their behavior in order to maximize utility, actors will also act in accordance with 
socially constructed roles and institutional rules (Pollack 2005: 22-25, Tonra and Christiansen 
2004). Smith (2004: 121-25) has identified five such norms in the context of EU foreign policy: 
confidentiality, consensus, consultation, ‘domain réservés’ and a prohibition against hard 
bargaining. The degree to which member states live up to these norms varies depending on the 
issue at stake and member states under consideration. 
 
State Level of Analysis 
 
Even though Baillie as well as Thorhallsson and Wivel integrate some systemic factors for 
explaining small state influence, subsequent studies have almost entirely focused on domestic 
sources of power to explain small state behavior and influence (Arter 2000, Kronsell 2002, 
Romsloe 2004, Björkdahl 2008, Jakobsen 2009). In his study of Finnish influence regarding the 
Northern Dimension Initiative, Arter (2000) points at the importance of innovative ideas and 
alliances as well as the ability to present oneself as an honest-broker. Kronsell (2002) argues that a 
small state’s reputation, expertise, national policies and undisputed national interest constitute key 
elements for small state influence. Whereas Romsloe (2004) highlights the importance of 
deliberation as a mode of interaction that facilitates small state influence, Björkdahl (2008) has 
drawn attention to the normative power of small states, their ability to use the rotating Presidency 
as an influence-enhancing tool and their diplomatic tactics. In his study, Jakobsen (2009) has 
made a first attempt to bring together those factors that small states must obtain to exert influence. 
He identifies four factors: a forerunner reputation, the use of convincing arguments, an 
engagement in honest-broker coalition building and the backing of initiatives with sufficient 
material capabilities. 
For the purpose of this paper, four factors are put forward for explaining small state influence: 
commitment, network capital, immaterial resources and the ability to deliberate. These factors 
have been drawn from a review of the small states literature, the governance approach as well as 
theories of communicative action (see Nasra 2010).  
The commitment of a small state is a first factor explaining influence. This commitment is 
measured in terms of relative salience or ‘the extent to which an actor will put into effect its 
potential to influence other actors and the decision outcome’. Those states that attach higher levels 
of relative salience to a policy issue are likely to display higher levels of activity, strengthening 
their position in the policy process (Arregui and Thomson 2009: 658-72). 
Second, in a context of increasing functional interdependence, networks become important 
formations to accommodate member states’ interests, to forge a consensus and to involve those 
actors that are necessary to elaborate and implement EU policies (Keukeleire 2006). Small states’ 
S m a l l  S t a t e s  i n  E U  F o r e i g n  P o l i c y  | 4 
 
 
embedment in these networks or their ‘network capital’ therefore becomes an important factor 
explaining influence. Network capital refers to the depth and breadth of the networks in which 
states are embedded. It has both a qualitative and quantitative dimension: while the former refers 
to contacts with those actors that have the necessary power resources, the latter is about the 
amount of contacts (Naurin 2007: 8-14). 
The resources of small states are a third factor. These are assumed to be immaterial rather than 
material: the extent to which actors can add value through their expertise, contacts and knowledge. 
This refers primarily to content specific as well as procedural knowledge. While the former is 
about information of a subject specific matter, the latter indicates the process of negotiation and is 
about the command of the negotiation procedure (Tallberg 2006: 30, Björkdahl 2008). 
A last factor explaining small state influence is its capacity to deliberate and argue strategically 
and to justify its national preferences. This implies the ability to steer debates towards a reasoned 
consensus: a situation in which actors try to ‘get the facts right’ and to acquire ‘common 
knowledge’ (Risse 2000: 8-14). To this end, small states may refer to some external authority to 
make validity claims, they need to project credibility and truthfulness in so far as the 
persuasiveness of their reasoning is concerned and arguments have to resonate with prior 
knowledge, agreed upon principles and norms, or commonly held worldviews (Ulbert and Risse 
2005).  
Figure 1 summarizes the systemic as well as the state factors and establishes their causal links. 
The next part turns to the empirical analysis that investigates the broad trends in the variations in 
the explanatory factors that determine the level of influence small states may wield. 
 
Figure 1. A framework for analyzing small state influence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III Belgium and EU Foreign Policy towards the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 
Initial relations between the EU and the DRC date back to the late 1950s and were primarily 
centered on development and economic relations. From the 1990s onwards, political 
considerations were more explicitly pronounced and member states enhanced the EU’s visibility 
by appointing an EU Special Representative (EUSR) to the Great Lakes region (Burundi, DRC, 
Rwanda and Uganda). The ensuing Congolese peace process (2002-2006) allowed the EU to 
deepen its role in the DRC, deploying two civilian (EUPOL and EUSEC) and two military 
(Artemis and EUFOR RDC) operations. Today, the EU is one of the key strategic partners of the 
DRC. 
Until the late 1980s, Belgium pursued its relations with the DRC largely bilaterally with a focus 
on commercial and economic issues. As Central Africa largely lost its economic and commercial 
significance by the early 1990s, Belgium moved its Congo policy into a multilateral framework 
and pursued a more ‘political’ policy. The waning of the initial troika formula (United States, 
France and Belgium) incited Belgium from the mid-1990s onwards to look to the UN and, more in 
particular, the EU to pursue its objectives (Coolsaet and Soetendorp 2000: 141).  
In what follows, some key issues characterizing EU foreign policy towards the DRC will be 
looked at, namely political relations, civilian missions and military operations. Table 1 
           systemic level                                state level          dependent variable 
1. structure of the policy 
area 
2. state of the policy area 
3. norms 
1. commitment 
2. network capital 
3. immaterial resources 
4. deliberation 
 level of influence 
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summarizes the level of influence Belgium exerted vis-à-vis the main EU initiatives towards the 
DRC. 
 
Systemic Level of Analysis 
 
Structure of the policy area. For Belgium, the institutional context to pursue its objectives 
regarding the DRC has posed considerable challenges. The political relations, the civilian missions 
and the military operations that the EU has been conducting with and in the DRC all fall under an 
intergovernmental regime in which the role of the EU’s institutional actors is limited. Moreover, 
the issue of the DRC is of a very low priority to the majority of EU member states. Given that EU 
policies towards the DRC are primarily driven by member states, Belgium is faced with the 
constant challenge of keeping the DRC on the Council’s agenda, reinvigorating policy debates and 
fostering consensus among member states. 
Although the role of the EU’s institutional actors is limited, Belgium has often relied on the 
High Representative (HR) and his/her Special Representative for the Great Lakes region (EUSR). 
Given that most member states lack expertise and diplomatic resources in the region, the 
HR/EUSR’s position as a neutral actor that provides EU-made information has allowed it to shape 
and frame Council debates, set the agenda and guide member states in the elaboration of their 
common positions. The launch of the civilian missions illustrate this role. From 2003 onwards, the 
EUSR together with the Africa desk of the High Representative’s Policy Unit explored the 
possibilities to integrate the European Security and Defense Policy’s (ESDP’s) civilian 
instruments in EU policies towards the DRC. After recurrent reporting by the EUSR, the HR sent 
a fact finding mission headed by officials from his Policy Unit to undertake an in-depth 
assessment to be presented to the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Even if a civilian 
dimension to EU policies towards the DRC were at that point at least debatable, the HR managed 
with the support of only a handful of member states to gather a critical mass to approve the launch 
of two limited civilian missions (Nasra 2010). 
 
State of the policy area. The DRC is of little interest to most EU member states. Apart from those 
member states that have extended development programs, such as Germany, the Scandinavian 
countries and the Netherlands, and those with a general interest for Africa, such as Italy, Portugal 
and Spain, only France and the United Kingdom have shown a particular interest in the DRC. The 
historic tension between France and the United Kingdom has for long been the main reason why 
the EU’s role did not go beyond mere development and humanitarian relations. In order to 
advance its objectives, Belgium thus had to aim at bridging the differing positions of both 
countries. Belgium skillfully used its Presidency of the second half of 2001 to that end: by putting 
the Great Lakes on the agenda of every Council meeting, issuing Council conclusions and 
launching the first-ever troika mission to the region, Belgium ‘set the locomotive in motion for 
long-term EU commitment towards the region’ (Bunse 2009: 123-54).  
In the following years, relations with the big countries would be important to advance EU 
policies, in particular regarding military operations. In the run-up to the Artemis and EUFOR 
RDC military missions in 2003 and 2006 respectively, the bilateral contacts between France and 
Belgium were important to steer the plans for the operation through the decision-making 
machinery. The close cooperation of the two countries in the Council bodies incited a political 
dynamic that fostered a critical mass of member states to support the (French-led) missions. 
Making use of the window of opportunity created by France, Belgium actively rallied for support 
to launch the missions (especially among the smaller member states).  
However, when the large member states’ positions where at odds with Belgium’s, it has been 
very hard to advance its national objectives. At the end of 2008 member states discussed the 
possibilities to send a military mission to the east of the DRC. While Belgium, among other small 
states, pleaded strongly and openly for an EU mission and was very active in supplying its 
analyses and points of view in the various Council bodies, all large member states remained 
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unfavorable to an EU intervention. The lack of a common appreciation of the situation in East 
Congo as well as the outspoken opposition of the large member states reduced the influence of 
Belgium to virtually none. One participant acknowledges that a country like Belgium cannot do 
much as long as there is no window of opportunity created by at least one large member state 
(Nasra 2010). 
 
Norms. While the notion of special relationships is gradually losing its significance in a Union 
where global ambitions are rapidly expanding, the particular historic relations between Belgium 
and the DRC creates expectations on the part of member states towards Belgium. Participants in 
the Council acknowledge that a non-intervention of Belgium on the issue of the DRC in the 
Council would be remarkable. Member states expect it to play an active role and to share its first-
hand information, contacts and analyses with other member states. In return, Belgium is offered a 
platform where it can defend and pursue its objectives. Even when most member states oppose a 
given initiative, such as the military option discussed in the Autumn of 2008, member states will 
still be interested to listen to Belgium. This relates to the unspoken rule stipulating that the 
considerations of member states with a specific interest in a given issue are taken into account. 
Furthermore, Belgium greatly benefits from the prevailing culture of problem-solving in EU 
foreign policy and the inappropriateness of hard bargaining as a mode of interaction. This implies 
that member states have a tendency to deliberate and share information and points of view in order 
to come to common positions and actions. Several national and EU officials recognize the 
disproportionate amount of information Belgium has about the DRC vis-à-vis other member 
states. In a context where a problem-solving logic prevails, a member state is offered the 
opportunity to valorize these immaterial resources.  
The discussions on a merger of EUSEC and EUPOL illustrates the possibilities that are offered 
by such a problem-solving style of policy-making. In early 2007, the Council Secretariat was 
working on an initiative to merge both civilian missions. While most member states supported the 
idea, hoping to cut costs of implementation, Belgium did not. Rather than isolating Belgium, it 
was offered the possibility to supply information and analyses based on the assessments of its 
national programs to both the Secretariat and key member states. Arguing that the missions were 
not yet fully fledged institutionally, Belgium claimed that the integration of both missions would 
risk jeopardizing the efficiency achieved on the ground. In the end, the Council Secretariat did not 
issue any formal proposal (Nasra 2010). 
 
State Level of Analysis 
 
Commitment. Belgium’s willingness to put into effect its potential to influence EU foreign policy 
towards the DRC is reflected in its high level of activity in Council bodies and in its elaborate 
national policies towards the DRC. Several participants in the Africa Working group (COAFR) 
and the PSC confirm that only a handful of member states are actively and regularly involved in 
the discussions on the DRC. Belgium takes up a central role among EU member states, aiming at 
keeping the DRC on the Council’s agenda and at fostering consensus among member states in 
favor of (or not to obstruct) EU initiatives towards the DRC.  
In addition, Belgium maintains elaborate and extensive bilateral relations with the DRC: it 
maintains the biggest foreign mission in the DRC, its ministers frequently visit the country and its 
foreign minister has his/her own personal envoy for the region, complementing traditional 
diplomatic staff. Belgium is the only member state to run bilateral military programs in the DRC. 
These national policies are crucial: when one is able to draw upon and refer to own experiences 
and commitments, one’s arguments and points of view gain in importance and are taken into 
account, by both small and big member states (Nasra 2010).  
 
Network Capital. Belgium is firmly embedded in a dense network of actors, existing of EU 
member states, the EU’s institutional actors and external actors. Belgian officials are foremost in 
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touch with a group of EU member states that are recurrent partners in relation to the DRC: France, 
the UK, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Especially with France, contacts are intense 
and bilateral coordination and information meetings are frequent, in Brussels as well as in Paris. 
Examples are a joint paper of France and Belgium in which both countries urged the Council 
Secretariat to work out a civilian dimension to the existing policies as well as the coordination of 
national positions such as in the run-up to the March 2009 visit of France’s President Nicolas 
Sarkozy to the DRC.  
A second group of actors through which Belgium exerts influence are the EU’s institutional 
actors, inside as well as outside of Brussels. The Council Secretariat’s and the EUSR’s 
entrepreneurial role in particular has offered extensive possibilities for Belgium to advance EU 
activity into areas in which it has an interest. For Belgium, it has been of utmost importance to be 
on the same line as the EUSR, either to move him/her to its position or to align itself with him/her. 
The secondment of national officials is a useful tool in this respect. Even though these officials are 
assumed to be independent, they can help to get national perspectives more easily taken into 
account. In the Council Secretariat, Belgium has seconded various national officials in the High 
Representative’s Policy Unit, in the services of the EUSR as well as in the missions in the DRC.  
Lastly, forums and partners outside the EU have been important allies for Belgium too. Close 
contacts with international partners have reinforced Belgium’s possibilities to wield influence in 
the EU: either directly by strengthening its expertise and credibility or indirectly via EU 
institutional actors, seconded officials (e.g. in the civilian and military missions) and key member 
states that are active in the DRC. Belgium maintains frequent bilateral diplomatic contacts on the 
DRC with Canada, Japan, Norway, South Africa, the United States and to a lesser extent China as 
well as multilaterally in the framework of the Worldbank, International Monetary Fund, Club of 
Paris and regional contact groups. Also in the UN, Belgium actively tries to advance its views and 
analyses. During its membership in the UN Security Council (2007-08), Belgium invested 
substantially in the DRC, namely in the issue of illegal exploitation of natural resources and in the 
renewal of MONUC’s mandate (Nasra 2010). 
 
Immaterial resources. Belgium has devoted relatively little material resources to EU initiatives 
towards the DRC. Most of its efforts are immaterial, keeping the DRC on the agenda, sharing of 
information and fostering consensus among member states. In elaborating the plans for the civilian 
missions for instance, the High Representatives’ Policy Unit picked up the concept of brassage 
from Belgian programs in the DRC. This idea denotes the integration of the DRC’s four regional 
military factions into one national army. The concept was subsequently translated into a proposal 
that laid the ground for EUSEC. Another example is the above-mentioned discussion on a possible 
integration of the two civilian missions. Employing its information and analyses, Belgium 
managed to convince its counterparts in the Council and the Council Secretariat not to merge both 
missions (Nasra 2010). 
Also its procedural knowledge can be cited as a factor that allowed Belgium to advance its 
interests. Its 2001 Council Presidency allowed Belgium to ‘set the locomotive in motion for long-
term EU commitment towards the region’ (Bunse 2009: 154). The immediate challenge was to 
move Africa, and the DRC in particular, from the development into the foreign domain in the 
Council. To this end, Belgium focused on easing out the tensions between the UK’s and France’s 
Africa positions which had long been at odds. By putting the Great Lakes on the agenda of every 
Council meeting, issuing Council conclusions and launching the first-ever troika mission to the 
region, Belgium used its unmatched expertise on the topic as well as the power of the chair to 
commit the EU more deeply to the Great Lakes (Bunse 2009: 123-31).  
 
Deliberation. Over the past decade, Belgium has proposed – on its own or in concert – several 
innovative ideas and arguments that have shaped the EU’s engagement in the DRC. In the run up 
to its Presidency, Belgium published an action plan that sketched out the core elements for a future 
EU approach towards the Great Lakes and which was later adopted by all member  states (Bunse 
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2009: 123-26). Another example is the development and continuation of the civilian missions. 
Besides their intrinsic value, these ideas were also strategic as they facilitated a consensus-
building process: they eased the suspicion of those member states that viewed Africa solely in 
terms of development policies and which were reluctant to link a strong political, civilian and 
military dimension to the EU’s engagement in the DRC.  
 
Table 1. Overview of the level of influence of Belgium vis-à-vis the main EU initiatives towards 
the DRC (2000-2009) 
 
Source: Nasra (2010) 
 
Additionally, Belgium emphasizes that it has no hidden political and/or mercantile agenda. As 
one Belgian official puts it: ‘Belgium no longer has any vital interests to protect in Central Africa, 
even in the DRC, despite its potential riches. But it is convinced that it has a moral responsibility 
to demonstrate solidarity with the region in Africa it knows best and where it still has numerous 
ties’ (cited in Bunse 2009: 129). Belgium has acquired a reputation among 
EU member states as a predictable and consensus-minded country that openly seeks to establish a 
strong European profile in the DRC. As Belgium realizes that its actions may  
arouse possible suspicion from its European counterparts, it aims at resonating its arguments by 
appealing to the overall aims and values of the EU. It makes a strong moral case and argues that 
the EU has a historical responsibility to assist member states’ former colonies with their 
difficulties today. In addition, Belgian authorities highlight the general EU’s strategic interest to 
engage in regions that are geographically close to it. 
initiative preferences of 
Belgium 
preferences of other 
member states 
influence 
EU-DRC political 
relations 
July-December 2001 
outlining the EU’s 
political 
relations/objectives 
towards the DRC in a 
body of Council 
conclusions 
FR-UK positions at odds; 
IT, ES, PT in support; 
other member states 
neutral/reluctant. 
high: troika mission and 
Council conclusions 
(12330/01, 13802/01 
and 15078/01) 
Artemis 
June 2003 
support United Nations 
(UN) request to launch 
EU military mission 
strong support of FR; DE 
remains absent; UK is 
hesitant; support of AT, 
ES, IE, IT, PT, SE.  
high: mission launched 
EUSEC/EUPOL 
May 2005- 
supports a civilian 
dimension to EU 
policies 
member states are 
favorable; overall little 
practical support 
high: missions launched 
and BE concept  is 
backbone of EUSEC 
EUFOR RDC 
Summer 2006 
support for UN request 
to launch EU military 
mission 
FR in favor (refuses 
lead); UK 
hesitant/absent; DE 
reluctant/negative 
medium: mission 
launched but remains 
short and geographically 
limited 
discussion to merge 
EUSEC and EUPOL 
early 2007 
opposed to merge the 
two missions 
member states and 
Council Secretariat in 
favor 
high: no merger of 
missions 
discussion to launch 
military missions 
October-December 
2008 
support to launch a 
military mission 
opposition of DE, FR, 
GR, IT and UK; support 
of ES, FI, IE, SE 
no mission launched 
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Belgium’s argumentative efforts have also contributed to the launch of Artemis and EUFOR 
RDC. Along the support of France and the backing of the UN, Belgium pursued a very active 
multilateral and bilateral diplomacy in Council bodies in Brussels and in some key European 
capitals (notably London and Berlin), aimed at fostering a critical mass of member states to 
support (or not obstruct) the launch of both missions. In contrast, the non-intervention of the EU at 
the end of 2008 illustrates the limits of a small state’s deliberative efforts. While some member 
states favored a rapprochement of the DRC and Rwanda (France, Germany and the UK), Belgium, 
Finland, Ireland, Spain and Sweden were (strongly) in favor of launching an EU military mission. 
Despite their argumentative effort in the various Council bodies and their willingness to contribute 
combat forces, the opposition of all three large member states (and external actors – Rwanda, the 
US and South Africa) reduced the leeway for deliberative processes to take root and, as a result, 
for small states to exert influence (Wivel 2005: 402; Nasra 2010). 
 
IV Greece and EU Foreign Policy towards Turkey 
 
The relations between the EU and Turkey go back to the early days of the European Economic 
Community (EEC). In 1963, the EEC and Turkey concluded an association agreement which, 
although tentatively, included the possibility for EU membership. In 1995, the EU and Turkey 
established a Customs Union. Turkey’s application for membership in 1987 was lodged until 1999 
when the European Council granted it candidate status. Even if Turkish membership has been 
considered highly problematic by many in the EU, member states unanimously agreed to open 
negotiations in December 2004. To date, twelve out of thirty-five thematic chapters are opened for 
negotiations, one chapter is provisionally closed and five chapters have been formally blocked by 
France (Nugent 2007: 481-82). 
Whereas instability long reigned Greek-Turkish bilateral relations, the rapprochement in the 
late 1990s preceded a period of relative stability and closer cooperation between the two countries. 
This evolution reflects a changing Greek attitude within the EU as well. In contrast to the 
obstructionism and the unilateral making of foreign policy that characterized Greek foreign policy 
during the times of European Political Cooperation (EPC), today Greece’s foreign policy towards 
Turkey is firmly embedded in the EU’s foreign policy framework. Subsequently, Greece has 
actively aimed at influencing the way EU foreign policy is defined, formulated and produced 
(Kavakas 2000: 144-61; Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005: 225-26). 
In what follows, several issues that are dealt with in the framework of the negotiations between 
the EU and Turkey will be looked at: Greek minorities, the Orthodox Patriarchate, good 
neighborly relations (delimitation of territorial waters, continental shelf, airspace) and the 
conclusion of a readmission agreement. Table 2 summarizes the level of influence Greece exerted 
vis-à-vis these issues. 
 
Systemic Level of Analysis 
 
Structure of the policy area. Since 2005, EU-Turkey relations are primarily dealt with in the 
framework of accession negotiations. Within this framework, Turkey is expected to adopt the 
EU’s acquis, comprising thirty-five thematic chapters. Before a thematic chapter can be opened 
for negotiations, the Commission screens the chapter and member states are required to agree 
unanimously. Before opening a chapter, member states define a list of benchmarks which involve 
a series of minimal conditions to which Turkey needs to comply. A similar procedure is followed 
to close chapters. As a result, the negotiations with a candidate country involve even more 
negotiations between EU member states and institutions than between the EU and the candidate 
country. This puts the candidate country in a highly asymmetrical context where there is little to 
negotiate about apart from the length and the quantity of transition periods. This leads analysts to 
S m a l l  S t a t e s  i n  E U  F o r e i g n  P o l i c y  | 10 
 
 
conclude that one cannot speak of real negotiations where two parties try to reach a mutually 
acceptable agreement (Verheugen 2000; Schrijvers 2007). 
The process of intra-EU negotiations is characterized by specific institutional features. First, 
accession negotiations are a strict intergovernmental process granting each member state a veto-
right. Second, the process is highly structured: the Commission publishes an annual progress 
report which forms the basis for discussions in the Council. At least once a year, at their December 
meeting, Heads of State and Government discuss the issue in the European Council. The accession 
dossier is frequently tabled on the Foreign Ministers’ agenda in the General Affairs Council 
(GAC) and is discussed by working groups on a weekly basis. Third, the Commission holds a 
strong position in the accession process. It prepares reports, submits its opinion and takes active 
part in discussions in the Council and European Council. 
Even though the conclusion of a readmission agreement4 between the EU and Turkey is linked 
to the negotiations process (it figures as one of the opening benchmarks of chapter 24 ‘Justice, 
Freedom and Security’, although the screening report is still being negotiated), it does not follow 
the same institutional pattern. Two points need to be stressed. First, member states define the 
negotiating mandate for the Commission who conducts and concludes negotiations. The Council 
and the European Parliament (under Lisbon) have to approve the agreement. Contrary to the 
accession negotiations, readmission agreements are voted by qualified-majority. Second, the EU 
depends on the willingness of the external partner in order to proceed with the negotiations of the 
agreement. The Turkish refusal to negotiate such an agreement on the basis of the EU’s conditions 
has long constituted an obstacle to start negotiations. The more flexible EU stance and the linkage 
to chapter 24 of the accession negotiations has lured Turkey into negotiations.  
Whereas Greece has not been able to advance much of its interests regarding readmission 
because of Turkish hesitance to start negotiations, the quasi-automatic character of the accession 
negotiations combined with the requirement for unanimity creates an optimal context for Greece 
to pursue its objectives. As every Presidency has wished to open at least one thematic chapter, 
Greece only needs to wait for the acting Presidency to put proposals on the table after which it can 
gradually increase its demands. 
 
State of the policy area. EU accession negotiations with Turkey arouse great and increasing 
interest in the EU, both among member state governments and public opinion. Even though 
member state governments unanimously agreed to grant Turkey candidate status in 1999 and to 
open negotiations in 2005, member states remain divided over the issue. The three large member 
states do not agree on how future relations with Turkey should look like. While the United 
Kingdom wishes to see Turkey accede, France has made it clear that Turkey has no European 
vocation and has therefore blocked several chapters that are directly related to accession. 
Germany’s current government coalition holds opposing views5, resulting in a rather ambiguous 
position. But even if the three large member states disagree about the outcome of negotiations, 
they do agree that the accession negotiations should continue as agreed in October 2005. 
The current degree of tension between the large member states is highly favorable for Greece’s 
ambitions to define and formulate EU policy towards Turkey. Principally agreeing to Turkish 
accession, Greece openly aims at influencing the process of negotiations in line with its national 
priorities. Issues of prime importance to Greece are the situation of the Greek minority in Turkey, 
the situation of the Orthodox Patriarchate, good neighborly relations (delimitation of territorial 
waters, continental shelf, airspace) and the conclusion of a readmission agreement. Regarding the 
latter, only a few member states have shown an active interest in the issue. Apart from the 
countries directly concerned (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Malta), Germany, France and 
Sweden are the member states showing most interest. Given the pressing issue of illegal 
migration, no member state is opposed to the conclusion of the agreement. Yet, certain member 
states such as the UK are wary of the utilization of the issue to serve other goals related to the 
negotiation process. 
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Norms. Member states recognize the particular importance of Turkey to Greece, bringing it in a 
position where other member states pay particular importance to its position and arguments. The 
historic ties, the geographical proximity as well as the outstanding bilateral issues give Greece a 
prominent position among member states. Moreover, Turkey is a ‘securitized’ issue for Greece: 
Turkey is brought out of party political debate, Greek ‘national position’ is beyond any public 
debate and Turkey gives a perception of threat to Greek territorial integrity (Kavakas 2000: 150-
51). All of these elements nurture this ‘special relationship’ in the eyes of member states. An 
important condition for member states’ understanding is the open and favorable position of Greece 
vis-à-vis Turkey’s EU bid. An example of this goodwill by member states can be found in the 
discussion about the readmission agreement. While the definition of the mandate and the 
conclusion of the readmission agreement is voted by qualified majority, member states would not 
easily outvote Greece on the issue given the possible national repercussions of an EU decision. 
Also the importance for Greece of the principle of third country national (TCN6) figures 
prominently in the Commission’s mandate. Although countries such as France and Germany 
might favor a less stringent EU position on TCN in order to grant the Commission sufficient 
leeway to negotiate an agreement, they support a strong reference to the principle. 
The strategic importance of enlargement to the EU imposes, however, certain limits on the 
room for maneuvering for Greece. The European Commission, Germany, Sweden and the UK in 
particular are very cautious that Greece does not interpret the negotiating framework too broadly 
and solely in function of its national interests. This could not only jeopardize the process of 
accession with Turkey, it may also set precedents for future enlargement to the Balkans, where 
(future) member states like Slovenia (towards Croatia) and Croatia (towards Bosnia and Serbia) 
may follow the Greek example. 
 
State Level of Analysis 
 
Commitment. Greece and Turkey maintain intense and active bilateral relations. They are tight 
together by century-old historical bonds and shared cultural traits. Since the rapprochement of the 
late 1990s, the value of trade flows, joint ventures and foreign direct investment has grown rapidly 
(Tsarouhas 2009). Furthermore, Turkey carries a great political weight in Greece’s public debate. 
As pointed out, the securitization of Turkey makes it one of the key foreign policy priorities of 
Greece, regardless of the ruling government-party. Participants in the Council note the very active 
stance of Greek officials: they are very well prepared, they supply their colleagues with ample 
information and analyses and they advocate their points of view with vigor. Their behavior clearly 
reflects the strong national interests of Greece and the considerable amount of human and political 
capital that it invests in the issue.  
This active stance mirrors Greece’s appreciation of EU policies. Those bilateral issues that 
Greece addresses in the EU are often issues that it has not been able to resolve on a pure bilateral 
level. The readmission agreement illustrates this point. Apart from Bulgaria, Greece is the only 
member state to have concluded such an agreement with Turkey on a bilateral basis. But since the 
signing of the agreement in 2002, little has changed. Despite skyrocketing flows of illegal 
immigrants via Turkey to Greece during the past few years, Greece has not been able to convince 
Turkey to fully implement the agreement. Consequently, Greece sees the EU as the best and most 
privileged channel to promote its national interests (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005: 229) and, 
hence, a way to move beyond its limited material weight in its relation with Turkey. 
 
Network Capital. Given the highly institutionalized, intergovernmental and quasi-automatic 
process of accession negotiations, Greece has little incentives to actively pursue coalitions. As 
each Presidency since 2006 has wished to open at least one thematic chapter, Greece has been able 
to apply a ‘wait-and-see strategy’: it just needs to wait for the acting Presidency to find a way out 
of discussions, and see if the tabled compromise meets its priorities. However, Greece can count 
on a handful of loyal allies (Bulgaria, Cyprus and to a lesser degree Slovenia) which prevent it of 
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being entirely isolated in discussions. Within such a ‘negative coalition’, Greece still appears as a 
cooperative member state. In addition, the presence of Greek nationals in several crucial 
Commission departments, such as the Turkey desk in Directorate-General Enlargement, further 
helps Greece to advance its analyses and points of view.      
The context in which the readmission agreement is negotiated is quite different. The external 
dependence of the EU to achieve progress, the possibility to vote by qualified majority and the 
general low interest of member states in the issue poses considerable challenges to Greece to keep 
the issue on the agenda, to reinvigorate policy debates in the Council and to foster consensus. 
Together with Cyprus, Italy and Malta, Greece has formed a small informal group that addresses 
the issue frequently in the Council. This so-called ‘olive group’ or ‘quatro group’ actively rallies 
for support among member states to keep the issue on the agenda, to foster consensus and to give 
sufficient political impetus to the activities of the Commission.   
 
Immaterial Resources. While the material capabilities Greece invests in EU policies remains 
limited, it has ample immaterial resources at its disposal. The expertise and knowledge of Greece 
on Turkey is disproportionately strong, leading several participants in the enlargement working 
group to state that there exists a clear informational imbalance vis-à-vis other member states. 
Greece shares its first-hand information, its expertise, its analyses and points of view with other 
member states. Regarding the respect of Greece’s territorial integrity and airspace, Greek officials 
supply their colleagues in the Council with plenty of information of what they consider to be 
Turkish violations. Also on the issue of illegal immigration, the numbers of arrested illegal 
immigrants that entered Greece through Turkey is communicated on a regular basis to other 
member states. This is also an important source of information for the Commission as it has no 
capacity to count, let alone control, immigration flows across the Aegean.  
Also the procedural knowledge of Greece is considerable. Contrasting Greece to Cyprus, two 
countries with similar interests and comparable issue salience regarding Turkey, participants point 
at their different strategies and knowledge of how the EU functions as a factor of influence. 
Whereas Cyprus tends to block or veto EU positions on and policies towards Turkey (Pop 2009), 
Greece acts more cautiously and formulates its positions in a rather moderate fashion. It gradually 
increases the strength and the tone of its demands and asks a lot of questions to both the 
Commission and member states on a whole range of often very technical issues. Subsequently, 
Greece actively formulates suggestions, both formally and informally, to advance discussions and 
to find a way out on those points that it raises. So even if Greek positions are often bordering the 
more extreme positions in the Council, their moderate behavior adds considerable credibility to its 
actions and interventions.  
 
Deliberation. Colleagues in the working groups consider Greek officials as credible and truthful 
partners that speak with authority: their arguments are well-researched, follow a logical line of 
reasoning and  include references to existing situations on the ground. Its positions are consistent 
and do not depend on the ruling government. Additionally, Greece often refers to fundamental EU 
norms and values in its interventions, appealing to the solidarity between member states. While 
Greece tends to interpret the acquis broadly, its arguments are embedded in or at a minimum 
linked to it.  
The Council conclusions of December 2009 under the Swedish Presidency illustrate the power 
of Greek argumentative efforts. Even though France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom 
and the Swedish Presidency did not want to include a reference to the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS7) in the GAC conclusions, Greece managed to insert the following 
reference: ‘the EU stresses again all the sovereign rights of EU Member States (…)  in accordance 
with the EU acquis and international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’ 
(European Union 2009a: 12). Greece’s argumentative efforts consisted of four crucial elements. 
First, it argued correctly that UNCLOS needs to be adopted and ratified by all candidate EU 
countries before entering the EU. UNCLOS, which does not constitute an integral part of the  
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Table 2. Overview of the level of influence of Greece vis-à-vis the EU’s accession talks with 
Turkey (2005-2010) 
 
Source: own interview 
 
acquis, is referred to in relation to aspects of conflict resolution. Even though not all member 
states agree with Greece’s broad interpretation of these aspects of the acquis, the discussion tends 
to narrow down to a mere appreciation of the moment when the Convention should be adopted by 
Turkey. Interesting to note, however, is that the Central and Eastern European countries did not 
adopt the Convention but at the end of the negotiation process. Second, Greece argues that the 
respect of its airspace is an integral part of the ‘good neighborly relations’ each candidate country 
needs to aim at (European Union 2005: 8), even so territorial disputes between (future) member 
states do not fall under Community acquis. Third, Greece appeals strongly to the overall EU 
values and norms, in particular the importance of solidarity between member states. This point 
was reinforced by the numerous Turkish military flights over Greek island in the summer of 2009. 
Fourth, EU member states previously referred to UNCLOS in the 2009 Association Council with 
Turkey where the exact same phrasing was inserted (European Union 2009b: 6). The practice of 
‘recurring language’, whereby the EU refers to previously used language in its official 
declarations, facilitated Greece to push for the inclusion of the UNCLOS reference. 
The issue of Greek minorities in Turkey and the Orthodox Patriarchate8 tends to follow a 
similar pattern. These issue touches upon core values of the EU, the treatment of minorities and 
freedom of religion form a key aspect of the rule of law and it are issues that can easily be referred 
to in previous EU documents and declarations. It is therefore very difficult for other member states 
to temper Greek demands regarding these issues, let alone argue against the inclusion of such 
references. Despite the complex nature of these problems, and the absence of references to the 
issue of Turkish minorities in Greece for instance, Greece relatively easily manages to include 
initiative preferences of Greece preferences of other 
member states 
influence 
Greek minority 
October 2005- 
inclusion in EU 
documents 
DE, ES, FR, IT and UK 
accept inclusion, yet do 
not want to overload the 
‘list of priorities’  
high: Turkey 2009 progress 
report 
Orthodox 
Patriarchate 
October 2005- 
inclusion in EU 
documents 
DE, FR, UK accept 
inclusion, yet do not 
want to provoke TR 
high: Turkey 2009 progress 
report 
delimitation of 
territorial waters/ 
continental shelf 
aims at including 
references to UNCLOS 
DE, FR, UK agree 
principally but consider 
this as a secondary 
issue.  CY, BG favor 
reference. 
high: Association Council 
19/05/2009; GAC 
conclusions 07/12/2009; 
European Council 
conclusions 12/12/2009 
airspace 
 
include condemnations 
of TR violations in EU 
documents 
DE, ES, FR, IT and UK 
remain prudent. CY, BG 
favor reference. 
high:  GAC conclusions 
17217/09; European Council 
6/09. 
Readmission 
agreement, 
chapter 24 
June 2009- 
reinvigorate debates, 
inclusion in political 
declarations, emphasis 
on third country national 
(TCN) in mandate 
CY and BG strongly 
favor agreement. DE, 
FR, IT, ES and MT 
favor agreement. No 
opposition. 
medium: European Council 
conclusions 19/06/09; 
Stockholm Program; 
European Council 
conclusions 12/12/2009 
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references to this issue in Council conclusions and EU documents (European Union 2009c: 13-
31).    
 
V Conclusion 
 
This paper has sought to balance the view that large member states dominate EU foreign policy 
and leave small states no choice other than to play at the margins of the game. It has not been 
contradicted that large states are dominating actors able to set the opportunities and to impose the 
limits of what small states can achieve. As pointed out in IR, the success of a small state’s 
behavior depends foremost on the existence of a window of opportunity. Whilst the preferences of 
large member states remain one of the dominating factors that influence the probability for such a 
window of opportunity to emerge, it has also been demonstrated that the structure of the policy 
process and the existence of generally accepted norms of behavior need to be taken into account as 
well. The former refers to the institutional characteristics of a given policy area whereas the latter 
connotes the existence of generally accepted practices and norms that temper the use of material 
resources.  
Nevertheless, a small state still needs to pursue active national strategies in order to valorize the 
existence of a window of opportunity. The study suggests that such successful national behavior 
needs to entail four elements: commitment, network capital, immaterial resources and the capacity 
to deliberate. All four variables where found to a varying degree in the activities of both Belgium 
and  Greece. In the respective cases, both countries are one of the most committed member states, 
they share their unmatched expertise and knowledge with other member states, they maneuver 
skillfully through Council discussions and they aim at reinvigorating policy debates. 
The paper has also argued to include the role of small states in analyses of the EU’s foreign 
policy-making system. Rather than dismissing their role from the outset, the notion of a state 
should be seen in relation to the power it exercises rather than the power it possesses (Mouritzen 
and Wivel 2005: 4; Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006: 654). Whereas being small is a characteristic of 
states at a systemic level, i.e. states that are unable to change the conditions for policy-making, the 
difference between small and big can be significantly reduced when it comes to a state’s actions 
and strategies. This relates to the inherent informational asymmetries that exist in complex policy 
settings (Beach and Mazzucelli 2007). Whether small or large, states tend to be dependent upon 
those actors that have extensive informational resources and that use these to match concrete 
solutions to problems. The subsequent demand for leadership can be filled by large as well as 
small states.   
 
Notes 
1 A small state is defined as a state that has a limited resource base, characterized by factors such 
as population size, geographical size, economic weight, diplomatic network and military 
capabilities (Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006: 653-4). 
2 EU foreign policy is understood in terms of relations with third partners. It thus comprises all 
(aspects of) policy areas where the EU establishes relations with third actors, thus including 
policies from all three pre-Lisbon pillars (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008).  
3 The methodological choice of cases is grounded in the most different systems design: the 
selected units of research are as different as possible with regard to extraneous variables. By 
conducting tests in a variety of sub-systemic settings, i.e. different policy areas, the problem 
caused by too many variables and too many cases is remedied (Anckar 2008: 390). The selected 
extraneous variables are the presence of EU institutional actors, the prevailing decision-making 
procedures, the relevance of the EU as a foreign policy actor and the salience of given issues to 
large member states. The similarities between the small states are their size defined in terms of 
material power, their position in the EU, a pronounced national interest in the selected foreign 
policy issues and the consideration of the EU as relevant platform for foreign policy action. 
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Important differences between the two countries remain of course, such as the general foreign 
policy orientation (Atlantic solidarity or European integration), the attitude vis-à-vis European 
integration (intergovernmental or supranational) and the geographical position in the EU. Yet, on 
the basis of previous research (Manners and Whitman 2000, Larsen 2005, Jakobsen 2009, Nasra 
2010), it has been shown that these factors are not determining the capacity to influence EU 
foreign policy. 
Empirically, the paper draws on academic literature, primary EU documents and semi-
structured elite interviews conducted by the author. In total 35 officials have been interviewed in 
the period 2006-10. For the Belgian case, the selected officials work(ed) for the Belgian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (including the Belgian embassy in Kinshasa and Permanent Representation to 
the EU), the Permanent Representations to the EU of the Netherlands, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, the European Commission (including its Delegation in Kinshasa) and the Council 
Secretariat. For the Greek case, the selected officials work(ed) for the Permanent Representations 
to the EU of Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Sweden and the United Kingdom, the European 
Commission, the EU Delegation in Ankara and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
4 The readmission agreement is ought to facilitate the process in which a third-country national, 
who is residing without authorisation in the EU or who has crossed the EU’s frontier illegally, is 
reintegrated into his or her country of origin (European Union 2010).  
5 The CDU/CSU opposes EU membership for Turkey and advocates the idea of a ‘privileged 
partnership’. Chancellor Angela Merkel restated this position on her visit to Turkey in March 2010 
(Martens 2010). The junior coalition partner, FDP, has no fundamental objections to Turkish 
accession to the EU. Yet, they emphasize a strict adherence to the Copenhagen criteria. Foreign 
Minister Guido Westerwelle reiterated the commitment of the German government to what has 
been agreed between the EU and Turkey in 2004, i.e. ‘the negotiations (…) with the aim of 
accession’ (Westerwelle 2010: 6). 
6 The third country national principle implies that the country with which the EU has concluded a 
readmission agreement also accepts people that immigrated through its country but do not have 
the country’s nationality.  
7 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has long been a bone of 
contention between Greece and Turkey. UNCLOS stipulates that every country can claim twelve 
nautical miles from its borders. Whilst Greece claims ten nautical miles on its islands bordering 
Turkey in the Aegean Sea, Turkey recognizes only six nautical miles. Turkey is not a party to 
UNCLOS and has always opposed the full application of the Convention in the Aegean Sea, 
arguing that it does not fully take the particular situation of the Aegean Sea into account. 
8 The issue of the Orthodox Patriarchate relates to the Ecumenical title of the Patriarch. This title 
refers to his ranking as primus inter pares in the Eastern Orthodox communion. It was agreed in 
the Lausanne Treaty, establishing the Republic of Turkey (1923), that this title could not be used 
because Turkey feared it could grant Greece a source of influence in Istanbul and it is at odds with 
the strict secular character of Turkey, risking to incite certain groups to claim the restoration of the 
Caliphate. Therefore, Turkey has always been highly skeptical about a possible reintroduction of 
this title.  
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